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Abstract. This paper shows that (i) project valuation via disequilibrium NPV+CAPM contradicts valuation via 
arbitrage pricing, (ii) standard CAPM-minded decision makers may fail to profit from arbitrage opportunities, 
(iii) standard CAPM-based valuation violates value additivity. As a consequence, the standard use of CAPM for 
project valuation and decision making should be reconsidered. 
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The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a bedrock for project valuation and is widely used for investment 
decisions (see Rubinstein, 1973; Copeland and Weston, 1988; Damodaran, 1999; Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 
1999; Brealey and Myers, 2000, Fernández, 2002). Arbitrage choice theory as well is a fundamental tool for 
valuing risky projects (see Nau and McCardle, 1991; Smith and Nau, 1995). The principle of arbitrage is a 
cornerstone in financial economics (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Black and Scholes, 1973; Varian, 1987), and is 
equivalent to the notion of “Pareto optimality” (Nau, 2004) and to noncooperative game theory (Nau and 
McCardle, 1990). Recently, it has been shown that this principle is the fundamental principle of economic 
rationality, unifying theories of subjective probability, expected utility, and subjective expected utility, as well as 
competitive equilibrium (Nau and McCardle, 1991; Nau, 1999). This paper provides some simple but hopefully 
enlightning examples showing that if a disequilibrium NPV alongside the CAPM is used for project valuation 
and decision making the principle of arbitrage is violated, as well as the property of value additivity. The 
analysis is confined to one period and it is supposed that a security market exists, described in Table 2, where 
three securities are traded, numbered 1, 2, 3, the latter being a risk-free asset. The market is complete (the asset 
span equals the whole space 3R ) and is assumed to be in equilibrium so that all assets lie on the Security 
Market Line (SML).1 Three states of nature may occur and cash flows vary across these states according to the 
probabilities 0.5, 0.1, and 0.4 respectively. All numbers are rounded off to the second (or third) decimal. Table 1 
collects the notations employed throughout the paper (the term ‘asset’ therein includes both projects and 
securities). The examples just rely on standard relations among variables. As for the CAPM, the value of any 
asset l is given by 
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Note that the return rate of the project depends on the cost of the project so that the resulting NPV= ll CV 00 −  is a 
disequilibrium NPV (see Magni, 2009). 
                                                 
1If a security did not lie on the SML, then its value would differ from its price. 
  
As for arbitrage pricing technique, let t be a security lying on the SML such that tl CC 11
~~ θ=  for some nonzero  
θ  (t is then a twin security). We have that the value of l  is the price it would have if it were traded: 
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Assume a decision maker faces project A whose cost is 738.48 and whose cash flows are 1200, 1000, 800 in the 
three states of nature respectively. Simple calculations show that the beta of A is the same as the beta of security 
1 ( 077.11 == ββ A ). This reflects in a cost of capital 1652.0)0433.01565.0(077.10433.0 =−+=Ai , which 
implies 
33.875
1652.01
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But note that project A’s payoff may be replicated by purchasing two shares of security 2 ( 211
~~
2CC A = ). 
Arbitrage pricing then implies that project A’s value is 
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We have then AA vV 00 ≠ . This fact is striking, since we have two different valuations for project A depending on 
whether we use arbitrage theory or CAPM. This simple counterexample allows us to claim that the standard 
CAPM-based valuations are not consistent with arbitrage-based valuations. 
 Formally, this difference derives from the following fact: if a project’s payoffs are proportional to the 
payoffs of a security traded in the security market, then project and security have different betas (provided that 
the project does not lie on the SML). Equivalently, if project and security have equal betas, then their payoffs are 
not proportional (i.e. the security at hand is not a twin security of the project). 
 To prove the above claim, let A be a project and let t be a security such that t lies on the SML and 
replicates A’s cash flows AC1
~
 in every state of nature ( 211
~~ CC A θ=  for some nonzero θ ), and assume A does 
not lie on the SML, i.e. AA VC 00 ≠ . If we had tA ββ =  we would have 
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(the last equality holds since security t lies on the SML). On the other hand, tA ββ =  would also imply 
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assumption AA VC 00 ≠ .  
 A project’s value in the CAPM depends on the beta of the project (see eq. (1)), whereas a project’s value 
in arbitrage pricing depends on the beta of the twin security (see eq. (4)). As just shown, a project and its twin 
security have different betas, therefore values in the two paradigms are different. 
 This contrast does not only make valuation different, but may lead to behavioral anomalies. The 
following example shows that decision makers may fail to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities if they 
comply with the CAPM paradigm. 
 Assume a CAPM-minded decision maker comes across an investment opportunity, say D, consisting of 
projects B and C (to be both selected or both rejected): Project B costs 926 and generates, at time 1, the certain 
sum 935; project C costs 64 and generates a random payoff equal to 466.4, 338.58, and −72.6 in the three 
respective states of nature. Given the security market of Table 2 and looking at eqs. (2) and (3), the betas are 
easily computed: 0=Bβ  (the project is risk-free) and 94.16=Cβ , and the costs of capital are then 
Bi = fr =4.33% and )( fmCfC rrri −+= β =196.08% respectively. The (disequilibrium) NPV of alternative 
D for a CAPM-minded decision maker is 
 
46.13
9608.11
)6.72(4.0)58.338(1.0)4.466(5.064
0433.01
935926 −=
+
−++
+−+
+
+− 











 
 
The CAPM-minded evaluator rejects investment D, because its NPV is negative. But this decision conflicts with 
the decision taken by an arbitrageur. The latter accepts to invest in D because it gives arbitrage opportunities. 
Indeed, security 1 replicates the investment’s payoff: an arbitrageur would sell short 0.77 shares of securities 1 
receiving 1006.65=0.77(1307.34) and use the sum to buy D at a total cost of 990=926+64, so gaining 16.65. At 
time 1, the arbitrageur will use the payoffs from D to close off the position on security 1 (i.e. final net cash flow 
is zero).  
 Finally, it is easy to see that additivity is not preserved in a standard CAPM-based valuation. Referring 
again to investment D, our CAPM-minded investor may aggregate the two projects’ payoffs and sum them to 
compute the NPV. This boils down to saying that he is (framing and) valuing D as a single project.2 A simple 
calculation shows that the beta of D is Dβ =1.095, and its NPV is then 
88.14)0433.01565.0(095.10433.01
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Additivity is then violated, since 14.88=NPV(D)=NPV(B +C)≠NPV(B)+NPV(C)= −13.46; the same is obviously 
true for the values: )(0 DV = )(0 CBV + =1004.88≠976.53= )()( 00 CVBV + . In other terms, the standard 
CAPM-minded evaluator undergoes framing effects (see Magni, 2002, sec. 4). By contrast, it is evident that 
additivity is not violated in arbitrage-based valuation: Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) Proposition 1 just shows 
that the value of an asset (in particular, a firm) does not change irrespective of whether one sees it as a unique 
asset or as a two-asset (equity-and-debt) portfolio. 
  
To sum up the results, this paper uses simple numerical counterexamples to show some anomalies in the use of 
disequilibrium NPV+CAPM for valuation and decision making. As an interesting by-product, deviations of 
decision makers’ behaviors from the CAPM prescriptions, massively recorded in the current literature (e.g. 
Brigham, 1975; Gitman and Mercurio, 1982; Summers, 1987; Graham and Harvey, 2001, 2002; Jagannathan and 
Meier, 2002; Brounen, de Jong and Koedijk, 2004) should be seen under a new light: they are just violations of a 
benchmark that contradicts the principle of arbitrage and infringes the property of value additivity (see also 
Magni, 2009). 
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Table 1. Notations 
lC0  
Cost/price of asset l  (i.e. outlay for undertaking/purchasing l ) 
 lC1
~
 
Payoff released by asset l  at time 1 
 lC1  
Expected payoff released by asset l  at time 1 
 
lr
~
 
Rate of return of asset l  
 
lr  Expected rate of return of asset l  
 
m
r~  Market rate of return 
m
r  Expected market rate of return 
 
2
m
σ  
Variance of market rate of return 
 
fr  Risk-free rate in the security market 
lβ  Beta of asset l  
 
lV0  
Value of asset l  obtained from CAPM 
l
v0  
Value of asset l  obtained from arbitrage theory 
 
li  Cost of capital of asset l  from CAPM 
 
cov Covariance 
 l =1, 2, 3, A, B, C, D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. The security market 
 Security Market (1+2) 
 1 2 3  
Outstanding shares 10,000 21,000  31,000 
Price 1307.34 445.66 119.81  
Cash Flow 





1120
1654
1820
 





400
500
600
 





125
125
125
 





000,600,19
000,040,27
000,800,30
 
Rate of return (%) 
(see eq. (3)) 




− 33.14
51.26
21.39
 





− 24.10
19.12
63.34
 





33.4
33.4
33.4
 





− 62.12
54.20
30.37
 
Expected rate of 
return (%) 
16.52 14.43 4.33 15.65 
Beta (see eq. (2)) 1.077 0.892 0.00 1.00 
Value (see eq. (1)) 1307.34 445.66 119.81 22,432,354 
 
